Persistent Homology of Perceptual Space
The question. Does perceptual experience have a stable topological signature — and can Husserl's eidetic reduction be read as the act of computing it?
If you've ever wondered whether experience itself has a shape, this is that question made computable.
The bet
Phenomenology already claims that experience has an invariant structure — the part that survives when you vary everything incidental (Husserl's eidetic reduction). Persistent homology is, formally, a way to read off the invariant structure of a point cloud: the features that survive as you vary the scale.
The bet is that these are the same move, and that TDA turns a famously un-falsifiable phenomenological claim into a computable, refutable one. If perceptual space has persistent features, you can measure them; if it doesn't, the metaphor dies honestly.
The setup
Definitions first — the part that has to be precise before any computation is allowed to mean anything.
The method — what actually gets run
- Pin down one perceptual space precisely enough to embed as points.
- Build the Rips filtration in Gudhi; compute H₀/H₁ persistence.
- Vary stimulus conditions; ask whether the diagram is stable (the eidetic claim) or drifts (the refutation).
- Write the setup section first — definitions only, no claims — and let computation earn the rest.
Open questions (honestly open)
These aren't rhetorical. Each is a place the project could still be a metaphor instead of a result.
- What is the right perceptual dataset — synthetic, psychophysical similarity judgments, or sensor data standing in for a modality?
- Is a persistent H₁ loop phenomenologically meaningful, or just an artifact of the embedding?
- Is this “secretly the same object” (an isomorphism) or “related by a map” (a metaphor that still needs the map written down)?